Texas Appellate Case Demonstrates Significance of Contract Terms for Continuing Care Eviction
On April 28, 2016, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed an award of some $145k in damages to an elderly couple for breach of a “Life Care” contract by their residential community. In Barton Creek Senior Living Center, d/b/a Querencia at Barton Creek v. Howland, the residential community staff attempted to refuse to communicate with the children of a couple, in their 80s, on the reported grounds that “communication with their children was unworkable because of the discord with the children.” The facility, Querencia, reportedly soon “terminated the Life Care Agreement with the Howlands and ordered them to vacate the premises within thirty days.” The Howlands did vacate the premises, moving to an assisted living community with a different pricing and service structure; however, they contended they were denied the “benefit of their bargain” with Querencia.
On appeal, Querencia does not challenge the finding that it failed to comply with the Life Care Agreement, but contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the damages awarded to Howland. Specifically, Querencia argues that the damages cannot be tied to the pre-termination notice being 30 days instead of [the contract’s specified notice of] 60 days. It also contends that Howland does not deserve damages for assistive services used after termination that they were already using before termination. Finally, Querencia contends that it properly withheld ten percent of the Howlands’ deposit pursuant to their contract.
The appellate court rejected these arguments with a textbook discussion of remedies for breach of contract necessary to protect the non-breaching party’s expectation interest:
Although the Howlands employed private care providers while at Querencia, there is evidence that the Howlands’ move to The Summit increased their monthly expenses because the monthly rent was higher at The Summit, it provided fewer services than Querencia, and services at The Summit were more expensive…. Howland claimed over a million dollars in damages, Querencia countered that Howland profited from the breach, and the jury awarded Howland $82,500 plus the unrefunded deposit. The evidence in the record supports the jury’s exercise of its role as factfinder regarding the damages award. The evidence also supports the jury’s award of $62,990 representing the portion of the Howlands’ deposit that Querencia did not refund. Querencia asserts that it was entitled to retain ten percent of the Howlands’ deposit under the terms of the Life Care Agreement. But the jury found that Querencia breached that agreement, and restitution is a permissible measure of damages for breach of contract…. The jury was empowered to and did decide that Querencia must compensate for its breach by returning the final ten percent of the Howlands’ deposit.
The finding of breach appeared to have been predicated on the contract’s specified grounds permitting termination, which included fairly standard provisions such as inability to meet medical needs, nonpayment by the residents, or a resident’s breach of “policies and procedures” that create a situation that is “detrimental to the health, safety or quiet enjoyment of the community by other residents or the staff.” The court appeared to be persuaded by the argument that Querencia failed to comply with a further contractual provision, mandating parties be given an “opportunity-to-cure” in the event of disputes.
Despite the affirmance on damages, the appellate court also set aside the trial court’s award of $166k in attorney’s fees for the plaintiffs, rejecting a “lodestar” argument for the award, and remanded the case for further proceedings on reasonable and necessary fees.
In reading the opinion (and the headnotes from Westlaw on the opinion, which refer to Querencia as a “nursing home”), I’m struck once again by the confusion that “continuing care” contracts, including so-called “life care” contracts, can cause for parties, although usually any landmines tend to affect resident rights, rather than providers. Thus, I would anticipate that in the future, providers worried about protecting their right to terminate relations with “troublesome” individuals, will attempt to beef up their “policies and procedures,” to give clearer rights to refuse to communicate with troublesome family members of residents.