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Katherine C. Pearson, Editor, and a Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network on LexBlog.com

Filial Friday: Family Caregiving & Standing Issues for Family Members

March 25, 2016

The 2012 decision of Health Care & Retirement Corp of Am. v. Pittas from Pennsylvania’s Superior Court continues to intrigue law students in its application of a filial support law to compel children to pay the care expenses of their mother.  

The latest example is a 2015 article by Hamline University School of Law student Katie Sisaket, who analyzes the topic from a Minnesota perspective in We Wouldn’t Be Here If It Weren’t For Them: Encouraging Family Caregiving of Indigent Parents Through Filial Responsibility Laws.”  She concludes:

The advancement of technology has allowed people to live longer than before, but with more health problems. With the government’s programs not anticipating this growth in elder population, the lack of funds will limit an elder person access to the necessary basic care. Filial statutes compelling adult children to provide support to an indigent parent have been around for thousands of years. With proper drafting of a well-defined statute, a filial responsibility law will appeal to family caregivers and further its purpose of encouraging stronger family ties. Therefore, Minnesota should consider adopting its own filial responsibility laws to relieve elder persons with the worry of not being able to access the necessary medical and basic care required. Only by splitting the government’s burden by imposing some duty on adult children will this be possible.

In the meantime, a Pennsylvania-based bankruptcy court case we reported on earlier, In re Skinner, that concluded one brother lacks standing to challenge another brother’s discharge in bankruptcy for liability to pay their mother’s assisted living fees, was recently affirmed by the Third Circuit.  

In the March 4 decision, the Third Circuit notes that Pennsylvania’s filial “support law” does not provide a right of contribution or indemnification,” and therefore the only relief is to compel the trial court to “apportion liability amongst the various children.”  

The Third Circuit further rejected arguments that the bankrupt son’s alleged fraud, in failing to use the mother’s resources to pay her debts, was not a claim the brother could make under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act or under a theory of unjust enrichment.  “Because William is not a creditor of Dorothy [the mother], the UFTA does not give him a valid claim. UFTA Section 5107(a).  Thus, because William does not have a valid claim against Thomas, he lacks standing to challenge the dischargeability of Thomas’ debts.”    

For more see In re Skinner, ___ Fed Appx. ___, 2016 WL 850950 (3d Cir. 2016).